ne. The militia, with superior
numbers, had chased the British from Concord, and had made a stubborn
defence at Bunker Hill; but the British were about to move with
overwhelming strength. To raise, equip, clothe, and feed armies was
the task of a strong administration, and there was nothing of the kind
in America. The ex-colonists not only had never known efficient
administration; they had fought against any and all administration for
generations, and their leaders had won their fame as opponents of all
executive power. To thunder against royal oppression won applause, but
indicated no ability at raising money and organizing such things as
commissariat, artillery, or a navy; and it may be said of such men as
Samuel Adams, Robert Morris, Roger Sherman, John Rutledge, Patrick
Henry, and Thomas Jefferson that their administrative training was as
far below that of their enemies in the North Ministry as their
political capacity was, in general, superior.
{79}
The Continental Congress, moreover, which assumed responsibility for
the army, could only recommend measures to the States, and call upon
them to furnish troops and money. In contrast to the States, which
derived their powers unquestionably from the voters within their
boundaries and could command their obedience, the Congress had no legal
or constitutional basis, and was nothing more than the meeting place of
delegates from voluntary allies. Such military authority as it
exercised rested entirely upon the general agreement of the States.
National government, in short, did not exist. Still more serious was
the fact that there were very few trained officers in America. The
American military leaders, such as Washington, Greene, Wayne, Sullivan,
were distinctly inferior in soldiership to their antagonists, although
Washington and Greene developed greater strategic ability after many
blunders. It was only through sundry military adventurers, some
English--such as Montgomery, Gates, Lee, Conway,--others European--such
as De Kalb, Steuben, Pulaski--that something of the military art could
be acquired.
Most serious of all, there were no troops in America who comprehended
the nature of military discipline. The conception of obedience to
orders, of military duty, of the {80} absolute necessity of holding
steady, was beyond the range of most Americans. They regarded war as
something to be carried on in their own neighbourhoods, and resisted
obstinately being dra
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