actory as it was
a long time indeed since we had stood so well with England. And in
France there was a pacifist cabinet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not
seem to share my optimism.

He complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to tranquilize him with
the argument that it was not to Russia's interest to attack us, and that
such an attack would never have English or French support, as both
countries wanted peace.

I went from him to Dr. Zimmermann (the under Secretary) who was acting
for Herr von Jagow (the Foreign Secretary), and learned from him that
Russia was about to call up nine hundred thousand new troops. His words
unmistakably denoted ill-humor against Russia, who, he said, stood
everywhere in our way. In addition, there were questions of commercial
policy that had to be settled. That General von Moltke was urging war
was, of course, not told to me. I learned, however, that Herr von
Tschirschky (the German Ambassador in Vienna) had been reproved because
he said that he had advised Vienna to show moderation toward Serbia.

Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home in Silesia, quite unaware of the
impending crisis. He continues:

When I returned from Silesia on my way to London, I stopped only a few
hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to proceed against
Serbia so as to bring to an end an unbearable state of affairs.
Unfortunately, I failed at the moment to gauge the significance of the
news. I thought that once more it would come to nothing; that even if
Russia acted threateningly, the matter could soon be settled. I now
regret that I did not stay in Berlin and declare there and then that I
would have no hand in such a policy.

There was a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5th, between the German
and Austrian authorities, at which meeting war was decided on. Prince
Lichnowsky says:

I learned afterwards that at the decisive discussion at Potsdam on July
5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval of all
the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be
done if war with Russia did come out of it. It was so stated at least in
the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian
Ambassador to England).

At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the English
press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death-blow
to "Greater-Serbian" hopes. I was to use all my influence to prevent
public opinio