that has been in man's memory, with the aid of the greatest learning at
the bar, and with the aid of all the learning on the bench, both bench
and bar being then supplied with men of the first form, declared from
the bench, and in concurrence with the rest of the Judges, and with the
most learned of the long robe, the able council on the side of the old
restrictive principles making no reclamation, "that the judges and sages
of the law have laid it down that there is but ONE general rule of
evidence,--_the best that the nature of the case will admit_."[51] This,
then, the master rule, that governs all the subordinate rules, does in
reality subject itself and its own virtue and authority _to the nature
of the case_, and leaves no rule at all of an independent, abstract, and
substantive quality. Sir Dudley Ryder, (then Attorney-General,
afterwards Chief-Justice,) in his learned argument, observed, that "it
is extremely proper that there should be _some_ general rules in
relation to evidence; but _if exceptions were not allowed to them, it
would be better to demolish all the general rules_. There is no general
rule without exception that we know of but this,--that _the best
evidence shall be admitted which the nature of the case will afford_. I
will show that rules as general as this are broke in upon _for the sake
of allowing evidence_. There is no rule that seems more binding than
that a man shall not be admitted an evidence in his own case, and yet
the Statute of Hue and Cry is an exception. A man's books are allowed
to be evidence, or, which is in substance the same, his servant's books,
_because the nature of the case requires it_,--as in the case of a
brewer's servants. Another general rule, that a wife cannot be witness
against her husband, has been broke in upon in cases of treason. Another
exception to the general rule, that a man may not be examined without
oath,--the last words of a dying man are given in evidence in the case
of murder." Such are the doctrines of this great lawyer.

Chief-Justice Willes concurs with Lord Hardwicke as to dispensing with
strict rules of evidence. "Such evidence," [he says,] "is to be admitted
as the _necessity_ of the case will allow of: as, for instance, a
marriage at Utrecht, certified under the seal of the minister there, and
of the said town, and that they cohabited together as man and wife, was
held to be sufficient proof that they were married." This learned judge
(commenting