l. They were admitted to
annul the will they had themselves attested. Objections were taken to
the competency of one of the witnesses in support of the will against
its subscribing witnesses: 1st, That the witness was an executor in
trust, and so liable to actions; 2dly, As having acted under the trust,
whereby, if the will were set aside, he would be liable to answer for
damages incurred by the sale of the deceased's chambers to a Mr.
Frederick. Mr. Frederick offered to submit to a rule to release, for the
sake of public justice. Those who maintained the objection cited
Siderfin, a reporter of much authority, 51, 115, and 1st Keble, 134.
Lord Mansfield, Chief-Justice, did not controvert those authorities; but
in the course of obtaining substantial justice he treated both of them
with equal contempt, though determined by judges of high reputation.
His words are remarkable: "We do not _now_ sit here to take our rules of
evidence from Siderfin and Keble." He overruled the objection upon more
recent authorities, which, though not in similar circumstances, he
considered as within the reason. The Court did not think it necessary
that the witness should release, as he had offered to do. "It appeared
on this trial," says Justice Blackstone, "that a black conspiracy was
formed to set aside the gentleman's will, without any foundation
whatever." A prosecution against three of the testamentary witnesses was
recommended, who were afterwards convicted of perjury.[62] Had strict
formalities with regard to evidence been adhered to in any part of this
proceeding, that very black conspiracy would have succeeded, and those
black conspirators, instead of receiving the punishment of their crimes,
would have enjoyed the reward of their perjury.

Lord Mansfield, it seems, had been misled, in a certain case, with
regard to precedents. His opinion was against the reason and equity of
the supposed practice, but he supposed himself not at liberty to give
way to his own wishes and opinions. On discovering his error, he
considered himself as freed from an intolerable burden, and hastened to
undo his former determination. "There are no precedents," said he, with
some exultation, "which stand in the way of our determining _liberally_,
_equitably_, and according to the _true_ intention of the parties." In
the same case, his learned assessor, Justice Wilmot, felt the same
sentiments. His expressions are remarkable:--"Courts of law ought to
concur wit