to decide that the mission of our navy is to
protect us _now_ against any navy, including the greatest, when
it would take us at least twenty years to develop and train a navy
to accomplish that task; and it would be equally foolish to decide
that the mission is to protect us against any navy _except_ the
greatest, because such a decision could rest on no other ground
than present improbability of conflict with the greatest navy,
or improbability for the very few years ahead (say two or three)
which we poor mortals can forecast.

This reasoning seems to indicate that the first step in formulating
a naval policy for the United States is to realize that any conclusion
as to which navies should be included in the mission of our navy
must not exclude any navy about whose peaceful conduct toward us
we can entertain a reasonable doubt, _during the period of time
which we would require to get ready to meet her_. For instance,
inasmuch as it would take us at least twenty years to get ready
to protect ourselves against the hostile efforts of the British
navy, we cannot exclude even that navy from a consideration of the
mission of our own, unless we entertain no doubt of the peaceful
attitude of that navy toward us for at least that twenty years.

Clearly, the problem is not only very important but very
difficult--perhaps the most difficult single problem before the
country; and for this reason, naval officers have long marvelled
that the leading minds of the country do not undertake it. Perhaps
one reason is that they do not know how difficult it is: that they
do not realize the extraordinary complexity of modern ships and
engines, and the trained skill required to handle them; that they
do not realize what Great Britain now realizes, that we must prepare
for one of the most stupendous struggles ever carried on; that we
must have a personnel both of officers and enlisted men trained
to the highest point, because they will have to meet officers and
enlisted men trained to the highest point; that the training must
be such that the skill produced can be exercised by night and day,
in cold and heat, in storm and calm, under circumstances of the
utmost possible difficulty and danger; that, while it takes four
years to build a ship and get her into the fleet as an effective
unit, it takes much longer to train an enlisted petty officer as
he should be trained, and a lifetime to train officers of the upper
grades. Perhaps also our le