nfidential nature
that it would not be proper to discuss them in public print. There
can be no impropriety, however, in making the general statement
that in all navies the endeavor is made to keep the mobilization
plans continually up to date, and to have them prepared in such
detail that every officer and enlisted man in active service, the
retired list, the naval reserve, and the naval militia, will become
instantly available for a predetermined duty, and that every shore
station and every necessary vessel will be ready to take part. The
plans prescribe methods in very great detail whereby the ships
and other vessels in reserve can be quickly put into commission
with full crews of officers and men, all their various equipments,
fuel, and ammunition put on board, and the vessels themselves sent
out to sea to join the fleet. In addition, plans are made whereby
certain auxiliaries can be fitted out at once and put into
commission--such as supply ships, ammunition ships, transports,
colliers, mine ships, hospital ships, etc. The mass of detailed
plans, orders, and instructions is stupendous and bewildering.
Years of study, trial, and rectification are required to get them
into such condition that the plans can be put into immediate and
effective use when war breaks out. The work must be done, however,
and with the utmost thoroughness, _before_ war breaks out; otherwise
it will never be done, if an active enemy is about, because he
will strike at once--and then it will be too late.

In most of the great naval countries the work of mobilizing the
fleet is comparatively easy, for the reason that the coast-line
is short and is not far from any part of the interior, enabling
reserves to live in fairly close touch with the coast and with
naval affairs, and so near the coast that they can get quickly to
any port. But the conditions in the United States are more difficult
than those in any other country, because of the enormous stretch of
our coast, the great average distance from any place in our country
to the coast, the difficulty of getting a naval reserve that could
be of practical use (owing to the ease with which young men can
make a comfortable living on land), and the perilous slowness of the
nation as a whole to realize the necessity for preparedness.

As an offset to this, we have the 3,000 miles of ocean between
us and Europe, and the 5,000 miles between us and Asia; and on
account of this we may to a certain exten