uires the
further detention of these Africans or their delivery to Spain or its
subjects."

Writing on October 24 to the Spanish representative with reference to
the arrest of Ruiz and Montes, Forsyth informed him that the two Spanish
subjects had been arrested on process issuing from the superior court of
the city of New York upon affidavits of certain men, natives of Africa,
"for the purpose of securing their appearance before the proper
tribunal, to answer for wrongs alleged to have been inflicted by them
upon the persons of said Africans," that, consequently, the occurrence
constituted simply a "case of resort by individuals against others
to the judicial courts of the country, which are equally open to all
without distinction," and that the agency of the Government to obtain
the release of Messrs. Ruiz and Montes could not be afforded in the
manner requested. Further pressure was brought to bear by the Spanish
representative, however, and there was cited the case of Abraham
Wendell, captain of the brig _Franklin_, who was prosecuted at first by
Spanish officials for maltreatment of his mate, but with reference to
whom documents were afterwards sent from Havana to America. Much more
correspondence followed, and Felix Grundy, of Tennessee, Attorney
General of the United States, at length muddled everything by the
following opinion: "These Negroes deny that they are slaves; if they
should be delivered to the claimants, no opportunity may be afforded for
the assertion of their right to freedom. For these reasons, it seems to
me that a delivery to the Spanish minister is the only safe course for
this Government to pursue." The fallacy of all this was shown in a
letter dated November 18, 1839, from B.F. Butler, United States District
Attorney in New York, to Aaron Vail, acting Secretary of State. Said
Butler: "It does not appear to me that any question has yet arisen under
the treaty with Spain; because, although it is an admitted principle,
that neither the courts of this state, nor those of the United States,
can take jurisdiction of criminal offenses committed by foreigners
within the territory of a foreign state, yet it is equally settled in
this country, that our courts will take cognizance of _civil_ actions
between foreigners transiently within our jurisdiction, founded upon
contracts or other transactions made or had in a foreign state."
Southern influence was strong, however, and a few weeks afterwards an
order