the Hegelian Dialectic_, p. 184.
Note 10, page 75.--_Appearance and Reality_, 1893, pp. 141-142.
Note 11, page 76.--Cf. _Elements of Metaphysics_, p. 88.
Note 12, page 77.--_Some Dogmas of Religion_, p. 184.
Note 13, page 80.--For a more detailed criticism of Mr. Bradley's
intellectualism, see Appendix A.
LECTURE III
Note 1, page 94.--Hegel, _Smaller Logic_, pp. 184-185.
Note 2, page 95.--Cf. Hegel's fine vindication of this function of
contradiction in his _Wissenschaft der Logik_, Bk. ii, sec. 1, chap,
ii, C, Anmerkung 3.
Note 3, page 95--_Hegel_, in _Blackwood's Philosophical Classics_, p.
162.
Note 4, page 95--_Wissenschaft der Logik_, Bk. i, sec. 1, chap, ii, B,
a.
Note 5, page 96--Wallace's translation of the _Smaller Logic_, p. 128.
Note 6, page 101--Joachim, _The Nature of Truth_, Oxford, 1906, pp.
22, 178. The argument in case the belief should be doubted would be
the higher synthetic idea: if two truths were possible, the duality of
that possibility would itself be the one truth that would unite them.
Note 7, page 115.--_The World and the Individual_, vol. ii, pp. 385,
386, 409.
Note 8, page 116.--The best _un_inspired argument (again not
ironical!) which I know is that in Miss M.W. Calkins's excellent book,
_The Persistent Problems of Philosophy_, Macmillan, 1902.
Note 9, page 117.--Cf. Dr. Fuller's excellent article,' Ethical monism
and the problem of evil,' in the _Harvard Journal of Theology_, vol.
i, No. 2, April, 1908.
Note 10, page 120.--_Metaphysic_, sec. 79.
Note 11, page 121.--_Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic_, secs. 150,
153.
Note 12, page 121.--_The Nature of Truth_, 1906, pp. 170-171.
Note 13, page 121.--_Ibid._, p. 179.
Note 14, page 123.--The psychological analogy that certain finite
tracts of consciousness are composed of isolable parts added together,
cannot be used by absolutists as proof that such parts are essential
elements of all consciousness. Other finite fields of consciousness
seem in point of fact not to be similarly resolvable into isolable
parts.
Note 15, page 128.--Judging by the analogy of the relation which our
central consciousness seems to bear to that of our spinal cord, lower
ganglia, etc., it would seem natural to suppose that in whatever
superhuman mental synthesis there may be, the neglect and elimination
of certain contents of which we are conscious on the human level might
be as characteristic a feature as is the combi
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