effects? Again, when a mental activity-process
and a brain-cell series of activities both terminate in the same
muscular movement, does the mental process steer the neural processes
or not? Or, on the other hand, does it independently short-circuit
their effects? Such are the questions that we must begin with. But so
far am I from suggesting any definitive answer to such questions,
that I hardly yet can put them clearly. They lead, however, into that
region of panpsychic and ontologic speculation of which Professors
Bergson and Strong have lately enlarged the literature in so able and
interesting a way. The results of these authors seem in many respects
dissimilar, and I understand them as yet but imperfectly; but I cannot
help suspecting that the direction of their work is very promising,
and that they have the hunter's instinct for the fruitful trails.

APPENDIX C

ON THE NOTION OF REALITY AS CHANGING

In my _Principles of Psychology_ (vol. ii, p. 646) I gave the name of
the 'axiom of skipped intermediaries and transferred relations' to a
serial principle of which the foundation of logic, the _dictum de omni
et nullo_ (or, as I expressed it, the rule that what is of a kind is
of that kind's kind), is the most familiar instance. More than the
more is more than the less, equals of equals are equal, sames of the
same are the same, the cause of a cause is the cause of its effects,
are other examples of this serial law. Altho it applies infallibly
and without restriction throughout certain abstract series, where the
'sames,' 'causes,' etc., spoken of, are 'pure,' and have no properties
save their sameness, causality, etc., it cannot be applied offhand to
concrete objects with numerous properties and relations, for it is
hard to trace a straight line of sameness, causation, or whatever it
may be, through a series of such objects without swerving into some
'respect' where the relation, as pursued originally, no longer holds:
the objects have so many 'aspects' that we are constantly deflected
from our original direction, and find, we know not why, that we are
following something different from what we started with. Thus a cat is
in a sense the same as a mouse-trap, and a mouse-trap the same as a
bird-cage; but in no valuable or easily intelligible sense is a cat
the same as a bird-cage. Commodore Perry was in a sense the cause
of the new regime in Japan, and the new regime was the cause of the
russian Douma; but i