will be more elegant in appearance.

* * * * *

AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED.--When a man holds his proper
station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do
you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid
conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object
as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why
then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has
always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who
follow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher! Who are they by whom
you wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say
that they are mad? Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen?

* * * * *

ON PRAECOGNITIONS.--Praecognitions are common to all men, and praecognition
is not contradictory to praecognition. For who of us does not assume that
Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to
follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice is
beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? It
arises in the adaptation of the praecognitions to the particular cases.
When one man says, "He has done well; he is a brave man," and another
says, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly," then the disputes arise
among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the
Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to
all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to
eat pig's flesh or not holy. You will find this dispute also between
Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon?
ought not that to be done which is proper and right? "Certainly." Well,
what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to
be done? "I do most certainly." Adapt your praecognitions then to the
present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought not to
give up Chryseis to her father." Achilles says, "You ought." It is
certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the praecognition
of "ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought to
restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you."
Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" "Yes, her whom
you love." "Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and
must I be the on