Revolution averted. It was a revolution strictly
defensive, and had prescription and legitimacy on its side. Here, and
here only, a limited monarchy of the thirteenth century had come down
unimpaired to the seventeenth century. Our parliamentary institutions
were in full vigour. The main principles of our government were
excellent. They were not, indeed, formally and exactly set forth in a
single written instrument; but they were to be found scattered over our
ancient and noble statutes; and, what was of far greater moment, they
had been engraven on the hearts of Englishmen during four hundred years.
That, without the consent of the representatives of the nation, no
legislative act could be passed, no tax imposed, no regular soldiery
kept up, that no man could be imprisoned, even for a day, by the
arbitrary will of the sovereign, that no tool of power could plead the
royal command as a justification for violating any right of the humblest
subject, were held, both by Whigs and Tories, to be fundamental laws of
the realm. A realm of which these were the fundamental laws stood in no
need of a new constitution.

But, though a new constitution was not needed, it was plain that changes
were required. The misgovernment of the Stuarts, and the troubles which
that misgovernment had produced, sufficiently proved that there was
somewhere a defect in our polity; and that defect it was the duty of the
Convention to discover and to supply.

Some questions of great moment were still open to dispute. Our
constitution had begun to exist in times when statesmen were not
much accustomed to frame exact definitions. Anomalies, therefore,
inconsistent with its principles and dangerous to its very existence,
had sprung up almost imperceptibly, and, not having, during many years,
caused any serious inconvenience, had gradually acquired the force of
prescription. The remedy for these evils was to assert the rights of
the people in such language as should terminate all controversy, and to
declare that no precedent could justify any violation of those rights.

When this had been done it would be impossible for our rulers to
misunderstand the law: but, unless something more were done, it was by
no means improbable that they might violate it. Unhappily the Church
had long taught the nation that hereditary monarchy, alone among our
institutions, was divine and inviolable; that the right of the House of
Commons to a share in the legislative power w