difficulty is a more subtle, and also a more important one,
because bearing on the general character of the Platonic dialogues. On
a first reading of them, we are apt to imagine that the truth is only
spoken by Socrates, who is never guilty of a fallacy himself, and is the
great detector of the errors and fallacies of others. But this natural
presumption is disturbed by the discovery that the Sophists are
sometimes in the right and Socrates in the wrong. Like the hero of a
novel, he is not to be supposed always to represent the sentiments
of the author. There are few modern readers who do not side with
Protagoras, rather than with Socrates, in the dialogue which is
called by his name. The Cratylus presents a similar difficulty: in
his etymologies, as in the number of the State, we cannot tell how
far Socrates is serious; for the Socratic irony will not allow him
to distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom. No one is the
superior of the invincible Socrates in argument (except in the first
part of the Parmenides, where he is introduced as a youth); but he is by
no means supposed to be in possession of the whole truth. Arguments are
often put into his mouth (compare Introduction to the Gorgias) which
must have seemed quite as untenable to Plato as to a modern writer.
In this dialogue a great part of the answer of Protagoras is just
and sound; remarks are made by him on verbal criticism, and on the
importance of understanding an opponent's meaning, which are conceived
in the true spirit of philosophy. And the distinction which he is
supposed to draw between Eristic and Dialectic, is really a criticism of
Plato on himself and his own criticism of Protagoras.
The difficulty seems to arise from not attending to the dramatic
character of the writings of Plato. There are two, or more, sides to
questions; and these are parted among the different speakers. Sometimes
one view or aspect of a question is made to predominate over the rest,
as in the Gorgias or Sophist; but in other dialogues truth is divided,
as in the Laches and Protagoras, and the interest of the piece consists
in the contrast of opinions. The confusion caused by the irony of
Socrates, who, if he is true to his character, cannot say anything
of his own knowledge, is increased by the circumstance that in the
Theaetetus and some other dialogues he is occasionally playing both
parts himself, and even charging his own arguments with unfairness. In
the Theae
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