flection on herself; c. the excellent
distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, speaking with emphasis,
'leaves to grow') between seeing the forms or hearing the sounds of
words in a foreign language, and understanding the meaning of them; and
d. the distinction of Socrates himself between 'having' and 'possessing'
knowledge, in which the answer to the whole discussion appears to be
contained.
...
There is a difference between ancient and modern psychology, and we
have a difficulty in explaining one in the terms of the other. To us the
inward and outward sense and the inward and outward worlds of which they
are the organs are parted by a wall, and appear as if they could never
be confounded. The mind is endued with faculties, habits, instincts, and
a personality or consciousness in which they are bound together. Over
against these are placed forms, colours, external bodies coming into
contact with our own body. We speak of a subject which is ourselves,
of an object which is all the rest. These are separable in thought, but
united in any act of sensation, reflection, or volition. As there are
various degrees in which the mind may enter into or be abstracted from
the operations of sense, so there are various points at which this
separation or union may be supposed to occur. And within the sphere
of mind the analogy of sense reappears; and we distinguish not only
external objects, but objects of will and of knowledge which we contrast
with them. These again are comprehended in a higher object, which
reunites with the subject. A multitude of abstractions are created by
the efforts of successive thinkers which become logical determinations;
and they have to be arranged in order, before the scheme of thought is
complete. The framework of the human intellect is not the peculium of
an individual, but the joint work of many who are of all ages and
countries. What we are in mind is due, not merely to our physical, but
to our mental antecedents which we trace in history, and more especially
in the history of philosophy. Nor can mental phenomena be truly
explained either by physiology or by the observation of consciousness
apart from their history. They have a growth of their own, like the
growth of a flower, a tree, a human being. They may be conceived as of
themselves constituting a common mind, and having a sort of personal
identity in which they coexist.
So comprehensive is modern psychology, seeming to aim at constructi
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