e a
reconnoissance on the Middle road, was ordered to halt and await
further orders. This brigade had advanced in the execution of its
reconnoissance to the picket line, and subsequently acted for a short
time with the First brigade in repelling the attack of the enemy,
feebly made on that part of the field. Soon after moving from camp
the heavy artillery firing and immense number of infantry stragglers
making across the country to the Back road from our left, showed that
it was in that direction the heavy force of the enemy was advancing.
The Fifth U.S. cavalry attached to the division headquarters was
deployed across the field and, together with the officers and
orderlies of the division staff did much toward preventing the
infantry going to the rear. About the same time the Second brigade
(General Devin) was ordered to move to the left of the line, cover
and hold the pike, and at the same time deploy men in that part of
the field to prevent fugitives going to the rear."
[Illustration: THOMAS C. DEVIN]
The rule about moving toward the sound of battle is succinctly stated by
General Merritt in his letter and does not admit of controversy. But I
may in all fairness call attention to the conditions that existed at the
time when it was asserted that Colonel Lowell took the responsibility to
move his brigade from the picket line to the rear, if not to the left,
and order the First brigade to follow. The division line of battle of
which the three brigades had been a part had been broken up. There was
no division line of battle. The First brigade had been ordered to
reinforce its picket line. The Reserve brigade which on the night before
received the order to make a reconnoissance in the morning was held to
support the First brigade and had "advanced as far as the picket line."
Devin's brigade had been ordered to the valley pike to hold it and
"deploy men to prevent fugitives going to the rear." May it not then be
said with truth that he was "distant and detached" and "without orders
that contemplate the contingency?" The enemy that attacked "feebly" had
disappeared. There was in sight no picket line either of the enemy's or
of our own. There was visible no line of skirmishers or of battle. The
"fighting on the left of our army as shown by the artillery fire" was
not only "heavy," as described by General Merritt, but indicated
clearly by the sound that the army was falling back
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