he result was that
popular enthusiasm was so dampened that the king was able to pursue
his own policy.

Then came the disastrous invasion of Serbia; the Serbian armies were
overwhelmed and practically annihilated, a few remnants only being
able to escape through Albania. The assistance that was sent in the
form of an Anglo-French army under General Sarrail came just too late.
Having swept Macedonia clear of the Serbians, the Bulgarians next
attacked the forces under Sarrail and hurled them back into the Greek
territory about Saloniki.

The Italians, too, had attempted to take part in the Balkan
operations, but with their own national interests obviously placed
above the general interests of the whole Entente. They had landed on
the Albanian coast, at Durazzo and Avlona, hoping to hold territory
which they desire ultimately to annex. Then followed the invasion of
Montenegro and Albania by the Austrians and the Bulgarians, and the
Italians were driven out of Durazzo, retaining only a foothold in
Avlona.

By March, 1916, all major military operations had ceased. Except for
the British and French at Saloniki and the Italians at Avlona, the
Teutons and the Bulgarians had cleared the whole Balkan peninsula
south of the Danube of their enemies and were in complete possession.
The railroad running down through Serbia and Bulgaria to
Constantinople was repaired where the Serbians had had time to injure
it, and communications were established between Berlin and the capital
of the Ottoman Empire, which had been one of the main objects of the
campaign.

In the beginning, however, the Bulgarians did not venture to push
their lines across the Greek frontier, though this is a part of
Macedonia which is essentially Bulgarian in population. There are
several reasons why the Bulgarians should have restrained themselves.
The traditional hatred which the Greeks feel for the Bulgarians, so
bitter that an American cannot comprehend its depths, would
undoubtedly have been so roused by the presence of Bulgarian soldiers
on Greek soil that the king would not have been able to have opposed
successfully Venizelos and his party, who were strong adherents of the
Allies. This would not have suited German policy, though to the
victorious Bulgarians it would probably not have made much difference.
Another reason was, as has developed since, that the Bulgarian
communications were but feebly organized, and a further advance would
have been extrem