would not be able to hold back the invaders. And
then, hardly had the real fighting begun, when Bulgaria definitely
cast her lot in with the Teutons and Hungarians and attacked the
Serbians from the rear.

While it was true that King Ferdinand and his governing clique had
made this decision months before, it is nevertheless a fact that it
was probably the blundering diplomacy of the Allies which was
responsible for this action on the part of the Bulgarians. Under all
circumstances King Ferdinand would probably have favored the Teutons,
since by birth and early training he is an Austrian and, moreover, as
he once expressed himself publicly, he was firmly convinced that the
Teutons would ultimately win. But the Bulgarian people are
sentimentally inclined toward the Russians and dislike the Germans.
Had not the diplomatic policy of the Allies played into the hands of
the king, they would naturally have turned toward the Allies.

Above all else the Bulgarians have desired either the freedom or the
annexation of Macedonia, which is almost entirely inhabited by
Bulgars. The Germans made the definite promise that Macedonia should
be theirs if they allied themselves with them. The Allies endeavored
to promise as much, but the protests of Greece and Serbia stood in the
way. Neither of these two nations was willing to give up its
possessions in this disputed territory, though later, when she saw
that her very existence was at stake, Serbia did make some
concessions, but not until after Bulgaria had already taken her
decision. Had the Allies disregarded these greedy bickerings on the
part of her minor allies and promised as much as the Germans had
promised, there is no doubt that the popular sentiment in Bulgaria
would have been strong enough to block Ferdinand's policy.

In Greece, too, there had been the same blundering policy. Here the
situation was much the same as in Bulgaria; the king, with his
Teutonic affiliations, was in favor of the Germans, while the
sentiment of the people was in favor of the Allies. Moreover, here the
popular sentiment was voiced by and personified in quite the strongest
statesman in Greece, Eleutherios Venizelos. Had the Allies made known
to the Greeks definitely and in a public manner just what they were to
expect by joining the Entente, the policy of the king would have been
frustrated. But here again the ambitions of Italy in Asia Minor and in
the Greek archipelago caused the same hesitation. T