rians to advance into
the Sugana Valley and to take Roncegno.

In order to appreciate the difficulties connected with all of this
fighting, it must be remembered that the fighting is going on in the
mountains, on ground varying in altitude as much as 5,000 feet per
mile. The mountains were still partly covered with snow and the
transportation of supplies, therefore, was exceedingly difficult.

As the month of May drew to its end, the Austrian advance spread
steadily. By May 23, 1916, the Austrians had occupied north of the
Sugana Valley the ridge from Salubio to Borgo. On the frontier ridge
south of the valley the Italians were driven from Pompeii Mountain.
Further south the Italians successfully defended the heights east of
the Val d'Assa and the fortified district Asiago and Arsiero. The
armored work of Campolono, however, fell into Austro-Hungarian hands.
The Austro-Hungarian troops approached more closely the Val d'Assa and
Posina Valley.

Orderly as the Italian retreat was, it was nevertheless a hasty one.
For the official Italian report for May 23, 1916, admits that
artillery "that could not be removed" was destroyed.

Both the violence and unexpectedness of the Austrian attacks are
testified to by articles published at this time in Italian newspapers.
A writer in the "Giornale d'Italia" of Rome says that "the Austrian
offensive came as a surprise to the Italian command and the taking of
Monte Maggio and other important positions was possible, because the
Italians were not looking for so heavy an attack."

A correspondent of the "Corriere della Sera" of Milan, writing of the
extensive preparations made by the Austrians for the present
offensive, says "that the Austrians massed 2,000 guns, mostly of large
caliber, on the twenty-four-mile front attacked."

Though it was now scarcely more than a week since the beginning of the
Austrian offensive, 24,400 Italians had been made prisoners, among
them 524 officers, and 251 cannon; 101 machine guns had been taken.

The Italians, of course, appreciated fully the deeper meaning of this
Austrian offensive. They understood that the Austrian objective was
not simply to reduce the Italian pressure on Trent or to drive the
Italians out of southern Tyrol, but to advance themselves into Italy.
At the same time, Italy also knew that, though such an advance was not
an impossibility, its successful accomplishment for any great distance
or duration would be seriously handicapp