ve
minutes. The mystery is increased by Jellicoe's statement that at
daylight he "turned northward in search of the enemy's vessels."

His story ends with something in the nature of a reproach for the
Germans because they did not return, although "our position must have
been known to them."

[Illustration: PLATE IX. Movement of Forces. 10 P.M. May 31st to 4
A.M. June 1st.]

Let us consider what the situation actually was at daylight. The
German fleet, as a whole, had a maximum speed of perhaps 18 knots when
fresh from port, and with every ship in perfect condition. According
to the English account it had suffered very severely, many of its
units being badly crippled. It is inconceivable that it was in a
condition when Jellicoe lost touch with it at ten o'clock at night to
make anything like its maximum speed without deserting these cripples.
Let us suppose, however, that it could and did make 18 knots in some
direction between 10 p. m. and 4 a. m. It would run in that time 108
miles. If, therefore, we draw a circle around the point at which it
was known to have been at ten o'clock, with 108 miles as a radius, we
shall have a circle beyond which it cannot have passed at 4 a. m.
(Plate IX).

If we assume a lower limit for its speed, say 12 knots, we may draw
another circle with 72 miles as a radius, and say that in all
probability the fleet has passed beyond this circle, in some
direction, by 4 a. m. We have now narrowed the space within which the
German fleet may be at 4 a. m. of June 1, 1916, to the narrow area
between our two circles.

But we know that the fleet, if it is in reality badly crippled, will
be under the necessity of making its way back to a base at once, and
that the detour which it makes to avoid the British fleet will
accordingly be as slight as possible. It certainly will not attempt to
reach Helgoland by running north or east. It will doubtless start off
toward the west or southwest and swing around to the south and
southeast as soon as Von Scheer feels confident of having cleared the
western flank of the British fleet. We may then draw two bounding
lines from the point which the Germans are known to have occupied at
ten o'clock, and feel reasonably sure that four o'clock will find them
between these lines. In other words, Jellicoe knew with almost
mathematical certainty that at four o'clock on the morning of June 1,
1916, the German fleet was within the area _A_, _B_, _C_, _D_, Plate
IX. His o