ignorance of the Spanish language, and on the impression
produced in England by the attempt of Philip II to make himself master of
the narrow seas, and invade our islands. An "armada" is not necessarily a
fleet. It is an armed force, an "army" either marching on land or embarked
for service on the sea, in which case fleet and fighting-men are included
in the word.
Philip II was King not of Spain only, but also of Portugal and of the Two
Sicilies, ruler of other European lands and "Lord of the Indies," the
Sovereign of a widespread maritime Empire in Asia, Africa, and America,
that had been won by a hundred years of enterprise on the part of sailors
and soldiers like Columbus and Vasco da Gama, Cortes, Pizarro, and
Albuquerque. The tradition of Spanish victory on the sea was a proud one,
and as we have seen Spain had borne a leading part in the latest of
decisive naval victories, when the Turkish power in the Mediterranean was
shattered at Lepanto; King Philip might therefore reasonably look forward
to success for his great fleet, and if it could once secure the mastery of
the Channel, the invasion of England might be regarded as no very perilous
enterprise. For the Spanish infantry were the best soldiers of the day, and
the Duke of Parma, who was to command the land operations, was one of the
best and most experienced leaders in Europe.
Looking back on the events of the wonderful year of the Armada, we must try
to divest ourselves of the ideas of to-day, and see things as the men of
the time saw them. Philip counted on divisions among the people of England.
The event proved that he was mistaken, but he had reasonable grounds for
the view he took. A hundred years later another fleet conveyed a foreign
army across the narrow seas from the Netherlands to change effectively the
course of English affairs. It found a divided people, and the invading army
was welcomed by a party strong enough to effect a Revolution that was a new
starting-point in English history. Nor must we suppose that the policy of
Philip II was directed entirely by religious views. If kings were easily
swayed by such motives, there would have not been such difficulty about
organizing a League against the Turk.
Professor Laughton, in his introduction to the "State Papers relating to
the Defeat of the Armada," puts the matter so clearly that it is worth
while quoting his words at some length:--
"It is not strange that the action of the fleet was f
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