r these
sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of
expression rather than a substantial objection in this. It is startling
to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were
said the ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation
and that Congress had then liberated him the difficulty would at once
vanish. And this is the real case. The traitor against the General
Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other
property, and he forfeits both to the Government against which he
offends. The Government, so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the
forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is,
"Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no
objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To
the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she has been the owner of
some slaves by escheat and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the
same is true of some other States. Indeed I do not believe it would be
physically possible for the General Government to return persons so
circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical
resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor
driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature
of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections, and running
through other parts of the act, will be noticed hereafter.
I perceive no objection to the third and fourth sections.
So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be
considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no
injustice to the persons embraced within them is clear. That those who
make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it is too
obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection
to the property of persons who have abandoned it and gone on a crusade
to overthrow that same government is absurd if considered in the mere
light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best
policy. The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the
persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very
objectionable, but a justly discriminating application of it would be
very difficult, and to a great extent impossible. And would it not be
wise to place a power of remission
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