re. This false news puts
me in a false position with my troops, who know it to be untrue, and I
should be glad if you would trace whence it emanates.

"Repeated to General Officer Commanding, Egypt."

_24th June, 1915. Imbros._ Three days ago we asked the War Office to let
us know the merits of the three new Divisions. The War Office replied
placing them in the order XIth; XIIth; Xth, and reminding me that the
personality of the Commander would be the chief factor for deciding
which were to be employed in any particular operation. K. now
supplements this by a cable in which he sizes up the Commanders.
Hammersley gets a good _chit_ but the phrase, "he will have to be
watched to see that the strain of trench warfare is not too much for
him" is ominous. I knew him in October, '99, and thought him a fine
soldier. Mahon, "without being methodical," is praised. Shaw gets a
moderate eulogy, but we out here are glad to have him for we know him.
On these two War Office cables Hammersley and the 11th Division should
be for it.

After clearing my table, embarked with Braithwaite and Mitchell aboard
the _Basilisk_ (Lieutenant Fallowfield) and made her stand in as close
as we dared at Suvla Bay and the coast to the North of it. We have kept
a destroyer on patrol along that line, and we were careful to follow the
usual track and time, so as to rouse no suspicions.

To spy out the land with a naval telescope over a mile of sea means
taking a lot on trust as we learned to our cost on April 25th. We can't
even be sure if the Salt Lake _is_ a lake, or whether the glister we see
there is just dry sand. We shall have to pretend to do some gun
practice, and drop a shell on to its surface to find out. No sign of
life anywhere, not even a trickle of smoke. The whole of the Suvla Bay
area looks peaceful and deserted. God grant that it may remain so until
we come along and make it the other thing.

On my return the Admiral came to hear what I thought about it all. Our
plan is bold, but there never was a state of affairs less suited to half
and half, keep-in-the-middle-of-the-road tactics than that with which
the Empire is faced to-day. If we get through here, now, the war will,
must be, over next year. My Manchurian Campaign and two Russian
Manoeuvres have taught me that, from Grand Duke to Moujiks, our Allies
need just that precise spice of initiative which we, only we in the
world, can lend them. Advice, cash, munitions aren't enough; ou