fantry straight for Pretoria; and my rage when, under
orders from Headquarters, I had to send swift messengers to tell him he
must rein back for some reason never made clear.

_5th June, 1915. Imbros._ Best part of the day occupied in a hundred and
one sequels of the battle. The enemy have been quiet; they have had a
belly-full. De Robeck came off to see me at 5.30, to have a final talk
(amongst other things) as to the Enos and Bulair ideas before I send my
final answer to K. If we dare not advertise the detail of our proposed
tactics, we may take the lesser risk of saying what we are _not_ going
to attempt. The Admiral is perfectly clear against Bulair. There is no
protection there for the ships against submarines except Enos harbour
and Enos is only one fathom deep. After all, the main thing they want is
that I should commit myself to a statement that if I get the drafts and
troops asked for in my various cables, I will make good. That, I find
quite reasonable.

_6th June, 1915. Imbros._ A very hot and dusty day. Still sweeping up
the _debris_ of the battle. Besides my big cable have been studying
strengths with my A.G. The Battalions are dwindling to Companies and the
Divisions to Brigades.

The cable is being ciphered: not a very luminous document: how could it
be? The great men at home seem to forget that they cannot draw wise
counsels from their servants unless they confide in them and give them
_all_ the factors of the problem. If a client goes to a lawyer for
advice the first thing the lawyer asks him to do is to make a clean
breast of it. Before K. asks me to specify what I can do if he sends me
these unknown and--in Great Britain--most variable quantities,
Territorial or New Army Divisions, he ought to make a clean breast of it
by telling me:--

(1) What he has.
(2) What Sir John French wants.
(3) Whether Italy will move--or Greece.
(4) What is happening in the Balkans,--in the
Caucasus,--in Mesopotamia.

After all, the Armies of the Caucasus and of Mesopotamia are not
campaigning in the moon. They are two Allied Armies working with me (or
supposed to be working with me) against a common enemy.

The first part of my cable I discuss the cause which led to the
disappointing end to the battle of the 4th already described and then go
on to say, "I am convinced by this action that with my present force my
progress will be very slow, but in the absence of any further important
alteration in