he present instance, or
when held so as to exclude the opposite half-truth.

It is this fact, that basic truth is everywhere made up of a _union of
opposites_, each of which seems, at first sight, to exclude the other,
which the Historian himself so forcibly expresses when he exclaims: 'In
the moral world, as in the physical world, nothing is anomalous; nothing
is unnatural; nothing is strange. All is order, symmetry, and law.
_There are opposites, but there are no contradictions.'_ Had he
understood the full meaning of this statement of the _inherently
paradoxical nature of truth_, and been able to give the Principle which
it establishes a universal application in unfolding the various domains
of human intelligence and activity, he would have grasped the Knowledge
for which he vainly strove, would have discovered the veritable Science
of the Sciences, the long-sought Criterion of Truth. In the absence of a
right understanding of this complex fact, that fundamental truth has
always two sides affirming directly opposite half-truths, he fell into
the error of mistaking the moiety for the whole, and has left us a world
in which, with all the aid that he has afforded us, we still fail to
discern the 'order, symmetry, and law' which undoubtedly pervade all its
parts--a world in which there is still exhibited, so far at least as
governmental, religious, and social affairs are concerned, an
'anomalous, strange, and unnatural' aspect.

Such consideration as it is feasible to give the first of these
historical propositions in these columns, was, for the most part,
included in that portion of the examination of the positions of our two
authors, which was contained in the opening paper of the series; though
no special application of Principles there elaborated was made to this
formula. It was there pointed out, that intellectual forces constitute
only _one_ of the factors in the sum of human progress, and that _moral_
forces are equally as important, being the second--the opposite and
complementary factor. In the light of that exposition, and of the brief
consideration here given to the second Generalization, it is perceptible
that the defect in this proposition consists, not in what it affirms,
but in what it does _not_ affirm. 'That the progress of mankind depends
on the success with which the laws of phenomena are investigated, and on
the extent to which a knowledge of those laws is diffused,' is a
statement which is undeniabl