must be of such a nature as to endanger the
public peace.

These three conditions must concur, must combine, if the section of
the law is to apply,--and not one of these conditions occurs.

As to I. There must be incitement to hatred and contempt; there can in
the case before you be no question of this point, and for several
reasons.

1. The offense specified in Section 100 cannot be committed except
there be an intention to incite to hatred and contempt. A contingent
incitement to hatred and contempt, an incitement by inadvertence, is
in this case not conceivable. If such a contingent incitement, an
unintended incitement to hatred and contempt, were conceivable, what
would not the consequences be? We have, all of us, for instance,
recently read certain speeches delivered in the upper house, which
have, we will say, filled me,--and not me alone, Gentlemen, but along
with me a very large part of the nation--with hatred and contempt to
the point of distraction. Does it follow that the public prosecutor
could take action against the speakers in question? He is not
competent to do so, even aside from the political prerogative of the
speakers, for, although such has been the effect of these speeches,
the purpose of these gentlemen was assuredly not to stir up hatred and
contempt. But it is equally true that no one can deny that the purpose
of my address was to impart knowledge. The most that the public
prosecutor can allege is that it was a matter of indifference to me if
the knowledge imparted stirred up hatred and contempt,--an allegation
without significance, since there is no such thing as an incitement to
hatred and contempt by inadvertence.

But, in point of fact, a deliberate incitement of this kind is in the
present case absolutely excluded for another reason, which at the same
time establishes that the address in question could not even have had
the effect of stirring up hatred and contempt. I, therefore, in order
to prevent repetition, beg to present this reason in connection with
the second, viz.: that my address could not have the effect of causing
hatred and contempt.

I have, therefore, to say, as the second count under this head, that
this address cannot possibly have had the effect of stirring up hatred
and contempt, and _a fortiori_ cannot have had that intention.

On what grounds alone can hatred and contempt be deserved?

On the ground of viciousness, which in turn is an attribute of
voluntary hum