to hatred or to contempt
of one another is to be punished."

Now, when the State speaks of the public peace it cannot be taken to
mean peace of mind, for the State is not a pietistic overseer
concerned about the subjects' peace of mind and the general sphere of
spiritual edification. What it looks to is the peace of the streets.
This is made quite plain by the phrase, "public peace."

The like is plain from all principles of law. Subjective states of
mind do not concern the State; it is concerned with overt actions
alone. It has, accordingly, no concern with hatred and contempt or
with instigation thereto in so far as they are a matter of subjective
sensibility only; but such instigation is subject to penalties only in
case it is of such a nature as to lead to overt action. This is very
patently indicated by the legislator in making use of the expression,
"Any person who endangers public peace." The legislator says not any
one who "disturbs," but any one who "endangers." If, in the
contemplation of the law, any incitement whatever to hatred and
contempt were punishable; if, in the contemplation of the law, the
public peace were to be "endangered" through the mere incitement to
such subjective sentiments; then the law would necessarily have said:
any person who disturbs the public peace by inciting. If such had been
the phrasing of the law, then it might perhaps be held that such
disturbance always follows when instigation to hatred and contempt is
made.

"Endanger" means to bring about the possibility of a disturbance, and
by his choice of this term, therefore, the legislator has shown us
that in speaking of the public peace he has not in mind a harmony of
sentiments--which in the case contemplated must already have been
disturbed, not simply endangered--but the peace of the streets. He has
shown that he does not consider that a disturbance of the public peace
necessarily has arisen in case of incitement to subjective sentiments
of hatred and contempt. Consequently not every case of such incitement
is held to be punishable, but only those cases in which the peace of
the streets is in danger of being disturbed. In other words the
penalty follows only when the incitement to hatred and contempt
attains such a pitch as to become dangerous, that is to say, liable to
result in overt unlawful acts. Section 100 is accordingly not to be
taken to say that any person who incites to hatred and contempt
endangers the public p