ttorney," said the Judge, "a document is evidence, and
evidence of the best sort."

"Undoubtedly, my Lord; and we have no objection to the document being
exhibited for the court to draw its own conclusion from, but we deny that
it is entitled to speak in its own explanation. A document is a thing
which speaks by its written characters. It cannot take to itself a
tongue, and speak by word of mouth also; and, in support of this, I may
call your Lordship's attention to the general principles of law governing
the interpretation of written documents."

"I am quite aware of those principles, Mr. Attorney, and I cannot see
that they touch this question."

"As your Lordship pleases. Then I will fall back upon my main contention,
that Miss Smithers is, for the purposes of this case, a document and
nothing but a document, and has no more right to open her mouth in
support of the plaintiff's case, than would any paper will, if it could
be miraculously endowed with speech."

"Well," said the Judge, "it certainly strikes me as a novel point. What
have you to say to it, Mr. Short?"

All eyes were now turned upon James, for it was felt that if the point
was decided against him the case was lost.

"The point to which I wish you to address yourself, Mr. Short," went on
the learned Judge, "is--Is the personality of Miss Smithers so totally
lost and merged in what, for want of a better term I must call her
documentary capacity, as to take away from her the right to appear before
this Court like any other sane human being, and give evidence of events
connected with its execution?"

"If your Lordship pleases," said James, "I maintain that this is not so.
I maintain that the document remains the document; and that for all
purposes, including the giving of evidence concerning its execution, Miss
Smithers still remains Miss Smithers. It would surely be absurd to argue
that because a person has a deed executed upon her she was, _ipso facto_,
incapacitated from giving evidence concerning it, on the mere ground that
she was _it_. Further, such a decision would be contrary to equity and
good policy, for persons could not so lightly be deprived of their
natural rights. Also, in this case, the plaintiff's action would be
absolutely put an end to by any such decision, seeing that the signature
of Jonathan Meeson and the attesting witnesses to the will could not, of
course, be recognised in their tattooed form, and there is no other
living per