ejoice in it. It was as we would have had it--offered by a southern
senator, advocated by southern senators, and on the ground that it "was
no compromise"--that it embodied the true southern principle--that "this
resolution stood on as high ground as Mr. Calhoun's."--(Mr.
Preston)--"that Mr. Clay's resolution was as strong as Mr.
Calhoun's"--(Mr. Rives)--that "the resolution he (Mr. Calhoun) now
refused to support, was as strong as his own, and that in supporting it,
there was no abandonment of principle by the south."--(Mr. Walker, of
Mi.)--further, that it was advocated by the southern senators generally
as an expression of their views, and as setting the question of slavery
in the District on its _true_ ground--that finally when the question was
taken, every slaveholding senator, including Mr. Calhoun himself, voted
for the resolution.

By passing this resolution, and with such avowals, the south has
surrendered irrevocably the whole question at issue between them and the
petitioners for abolition in the District. It has, unwittingly but
explicitly, conceded the main question argued in the preceding pages.

The _only_ ground taken against the right of Congress to abolish slavery
in the District is, that slavery existed in Maryland and Virginia when
the cession was made, and "_as it still continues in both of them_, it
could not be abolished without a violation of that good faith which was
implied in the cession," &c. The _sole argument_ is _not_ that exclusive
_sovereignty_ has no power to abolish slavery within its jurisdiction,
_nor_ that the powers of even _ordinary legislation_ cannot do it,--nor
that the clause granting Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases
whatsoever over such District," gives no power to do it; but that the
_unexpressed expectation_ of one of the parties that the other would not
"in _all_ cases" use the power which said party had consented _might be
used "in all cases," prohibits_ the use of it. The only cardinal point
in the discussion, is here not only _yielded_, but formally laid down by
the South as the leading article in their creed on the question of
Congressional jurisdiction over slavery in the District. The _sole
reason_ given why Congress should not abolish, and the sole evidence
that if it did, such abolition would be a violation of "good faith," is
that "_slavery still continues in those states_,"--thus explicitly
admitting, that if slavery did _not_ "still continue" in thos