e all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by
general terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposed
to stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of
general ideas: and ideas become general, by separating from them the
circumstances of time and place, and any other ideas that may determine
them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction
they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of
which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call
it) of that sort.
7. Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.
But, to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be
amiss to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and observe
by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from
our first infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of
the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone) are, like
the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the
mother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there,
represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are
confined to these individuals; and the names of NURSE and MAMMA, the
child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when time
and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that there are a great
many other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape,
and several other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those
persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find
those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with
others, the name MAN, for example. And thus they come to have a general
name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but only leave
out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that
which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
8. And further enlarge our complex ideas, by still leaving out
properties contained in them.
By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of MAN, they
easily advance to more general names and notions. For, observing that
several things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore
be comprehended out under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein
they agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them
into one ide
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