not only acknowledged the power, but embraced with zeal the party, of
Constantine.

From Milan to Rome, the AEmilian and Flaminian highways offered an easy
march of about four hundred miles; but though Constantine was impatient
to encounter the tyrant, he prudently directed his operations against
another army of Italians, who, by their strength and position, might
either oppose his progress, or, in case of a misfortune, might intercept
his retreat. Ruricius Pompeianus, a general distinguished by his valor
and ability, had under his command the city of Verona, and all the
troops that were stationed in the province of Venetia. As soon as he was
informed that Constantine was advancing towards him, he detached a large
body of cavalry which was defeated in an engagement near Brescia,
and pursued by the Gallic legions as far as the gates of Verona. The
necessity, the importance, and the difficulties of the siege of Verona,
immediately presented themselves to the sagacious mind of Constantine.
The city was accessible only by a narrow peninsula towards the west, as
the other three sides were surrounded by the Adige, a rapid river, which
covered the province of Venetia, from whence the besieged derived an
inexhaustible supply of men and provisions. It was not without great
difficulty, and after several fruitless attempts, that Constantine found
means to pass the river at some distance above the city, and in a place
where the torrent was less violent. He then encompassed Verona with
strong lines, pushed his attacks with prudent vigor, and repelled a
desperate sally of Pompeianus. That intrepid general, when he had used
every means of defence that the strength of the place or that of the
garrison could afford, secretly escaped from Verona, anxious not for
his own, but for the public safety. With indefatigable diligence he soon
collected an army sufficient either to meet Constantine in the field, or
to attack him if he obstinately remained within his lines. The emperor,
attentive to the motions, and informed of the approach of so formidable
an enemy, left a part of his legions to continue the operations of the
siege, whilst, at the head of those troops on whose valor and fidelity
he more particularly depended, he advanced in person to engage the
general of Maxentius. The army of Gaul was drawn up in two lines,
according to the usual practice of war; but their experienced leader,
perceiving that the numbers of the Italians far exceed