e his seniors?... This truth I am well assured of
that they will not serve under him. I leave you to guess, therefore,
at the situation this army would be in at so important a crisis, if
this event should take place."
This opposition to his presumptuous aspirations at once threw Conway
into a faction forming under the auspices of General Mifflin. This
gentleman had recently tendered his resignation of the commission of
major-general and quartermaster-general on the plea of ill health, but
was busily engaged in intrigues against the commander-in-chief,
towards whom he had long cherished a secret hostility. Conway now
joined with him heart and hand, and soon became so active and
prominent a member of the faction that it acquired the name of
_Conway's Cabal_. The object was to depreciate the military character
of Washington, in comparison with that of Gates, to whom was
attributed the whole success of the Northern campaign.
Gates was perfectly ready for such an elevation. In fact, in the
excitement of his vanity, he appears to have forgotten that there was
a commander-in-chief, to whom he was accountable. He neglected to send
him any despatch on the subject of the surrender of Burgoyne,
contenting himself with sending one to Congress, then sitting at
Yorktown. Washington was left to hear of the important event by casual
rumor, until he received a copy of the capitulation in a letter from
General Putnam.
Gates was equally neglectful to inform him of the disposition he
intended to make of the army under his command. He delayed even to
forward Morgan's rifle corps, though their services were no longer
needed in his camp, and were so much required in the South. It was
determined, therefore, in a council of war, that one of Washington's
staff should be sent to Gates to represent the critical state of
affairs. Colonel Alexander Hamilton, his youthful but intelligent
aide-de-camp, was charged with this mission. He bore a letter from
Washington to Gates, dated October 30th, of which the following is an
extract: "By this opportunity I do myself the pleasure to congratulate
you on the signal success of the army under your command.... At the
same time, I cannot but regret that a matter of such magnitude, and so
interesting to our general operations, should have reached me by
report only; or through the channel of letters not bearing that
authenticity which the importance of it required, and which it would
have received by a li
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