ed the sagacity
of Washington, but he supposed it to have been caused by the arrival
of the commissioners from Great Britain. The force in the city in the
meantime had been much reduced. Five thousand men had been detached to
aid in a sudden descent on the French possessions in the West Indies;
three thousand more to Florida. Most of the cavalry with other troops
had been shipped with the provision train and heavy baggage to New
York. The effective force remaining with Sir Henry was now about nine
or ten thousand men; that under Washington was a little more than
twelve thousand Continentals, and about thirteen hundred militia. It
had already acquired considerable proficiency in tactics and field
manoeuvring under the diligent instructions of Steuben.

Early in June it was evident that a total evacuation of the city was
on the point of taking place; and circumstances convinced Washington
that the march of the main body would be through the Jerseys. Some of
his officers thought differently, especially General Lee, who had now
the command of a division composed of Poor, Varnum, and Huntington's
brigades. In consequence, Washington called a general council of war
on the 17th, to consider what measures to adopt; whether to undertake
any enterprise against the enemy in their present circumstances--whether
the army should remain in its actual position, until the final
evacuation had taken place, or move immediately toward the
Delaware--whether, should the enemy march through the Jerseys, it
would be advisable to attack them while on the way, or to push on
directly to the Hudson, and secure that important communication
between the Eastern and Southern States? In case an attack while on
the march were determined on, should it be a partial or a general one?

Lee was opposed to an attack of any kind. He would make a bridge of
gold for the enemy. They were nearly equal in number to the Americans,
and far superior in discipline. An attack would endanger the safety of
the cause. He advised merely to follow the enemy, observe their
motions, and prevent them from committing any excesses. Lee's opinions
had still great weight with the army; most of the officers, both
foreign and American, concurred with him. Greene, Lafayette, Wayne,
and Cadwalader, thought differently. They could not brook that the
enemy should evacuate the city, and make a long march through the
country unmolested. Washington seeing such want of unanimity among his