e the impression that the British army was moving into New
England. By this bit of strategy, Burgoyne expected to keep back
reenforcements from Schuyler. Riedesel's presence also gave much
encouragement to the loyalists, who now joined Burgoyne in such numbers
as to persuade him that a majority of the inhabitants were for the king.
The information they gave, proved of vital consequence in determining
Burgoyne's operations in the near future.
Two routes were now open to Burgoyne. Contrary to sound judgment, he
decided on marching to Fort Edward, by way of Fort Anne, instead of
going back to Ticonderoga, making that his _depot_, and proceeding
thence up Lake George to Fort Edward and the Hudson. Unquestionably, the
latter route would have taken him to Albany, by the time he actually
reached Fort Edward, and in much better condition to fight.
Burgoyne had said he was afraid that going back to Ticonderoga would
dispirit his soldiers. It could have been done in half the time required
for bringing the supplies up to it at Skenesborough, to say nothing of
the long and fatiguing marches saved by water carriage across Lake
George.
Be that as it may, from the moment Burgoyne decided in favor of the Fort
Anne route, that moment the possession of Fort Anne became a necessity
to him. Had he first attacked it with fifteen hundred men, instead of
five hundred, he would have taken it; but even if he had occupied it
after the fight of the eighth, the Americans would have been prevented
from blocking his way, as they subsequently did with so much effect. In
Burgoyne's case, delays were most dangerous. It seems only too plain,
that he was the sort of general who would rather commit two errors than
retract one.
Let us see what Burgoyne's chosen route offered of advantage or
disadvantage. The distance by it to Fort Edward is only twenty-six
miles. By a good road, in easy marches, an army should be there in two
days; in an exigency, in one. It was mostly a wilderness country,
and, though generally level, much of it was a bog, which could only be
made passable by laying down a corduroy road. There were miles of such
road to be repaired or built before wagons or artillery could be dragged
over it. Indeed, a worse country to march through can hardly be
imagined. On the other hand, of this twenty-six miles, Wood Creek, a
tributary of Lake Champlain, afforded boat navigation for nine or ten,
or as far as Fort Anne, for the artillery, stor
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