ver fight. Some of Burgoyne's generals advised putting
the Hudson between themselves and Gates, as the only means now left of
saving the army; none, it is believed, advocated risking another battle.
Burgoyne could not bring himself to order a retreat without first making
one more effort for victory. He dwelt strongly upon the difficulty of
withdrawing the army in the face of so vigilant and powerful an enemy.
He maintained his own opinion that even in order to secure an honorable
retreat it would be necessary to fight, and it was so determined.
It is evident that Burgoyne nourished a secret hope that fortune might
yet take a turn favorable to him; otherwise, it is impossible to account
for his making this last and most desperate effort, under conditions
even less favorable than had attended his attack of the 19th of
September.
Fifteen hundred men and ten guns were chosen for the attempt. In plain
language, Burgoyne started out to provoke a combat with an enemy greatly
his superior in numbers, with less than half the force his former
demonstration had been made with. His idea seems to have been to take up
a position from which his cannon would reach the American works. After
intrenching, it was his intention to bring up his heavy artillery, and
open a cannonade which he was confident the enemy could not withstand,
as their defensive works were chiefly built of logs. And out of this
state of things, Burgoyne hoped to derive some substantial benefit.
This plan differed from that of the 19th of September, in that it looked
chiefly to obtaining a more advantageous position; while on the former
occasion it was attempted to force a way through or around the American
left. The lesson of that day had not been lost on Burgoyne, who now
meant to utilize his artillery to the utmost, rather than risk the
inevitable slaughter that must ensue from an attempt to carry the
American lines by storm.
Everything depended upon gaining the desired position before the
Americans could make their dispositions to thwart the attempt.
The importance to the army of this movement induced Burgoyne to call his
three best generals to his aid; so that nothing that experience could
suggest, or skill attempt, should be left undone. It was kept a profound
secret till the troops who were going out to fight were actually under
arms. The rest of the army was to remain in the works; so that, if worst
came to worst, the enemy might not reap any decide
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