accept battle if the Romans dared to attack the mountain;
besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if
divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led
Caesar to resolve upon leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing
a camp on this spot and retrenching it. When the works were completed
the legions were placed before the retrenchments and the cavalry
distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had
recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed
from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the
Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the
same time their order of battle; placed them in front of the camp, and
toward the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to them.
Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish troops,
who fled in haste.

Although the fire prevented Caesar from seeing the retreat of the enemy
he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry
in pursuit, but he marched slowly in fear of some stratagem, suspecting
the barbarians to have formed the design of drawing the Romans to
disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride
through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass
over a distance of ten miles and halt in a place strongly fortified by
nature (Mont Ganelon), where they pitched their camp. In this position
they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent
ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to
forage. After several encounters of this kind Caesar learned by a
prisoner that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with six thousand picked
infantry and one thousand horsemen, was preparing an ambuscade in places
where the abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans.
In consequence of this information he sent forward the cavalry, which
was always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some
light-armed auxiliaries, while he himself, with a greater number of
legions, followed them as closely as possible.

The enemy had posted themselves in a plain--that of Choisy-au-Bac--of
about one thousand paces in length and the same in breadth, surrounded
on one side by forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to
pass (the Aisne). The cavalry becoming acquainted with the designs of
the Gau