of Mahan, have written a noteworthy volume in their _History
of Sea Power_, published in excellent form, generously supplied with maps,
illustrations, and index. The title suggests Mahan's classic which is
largely followed in plan and treatment. It will be remembered that his
writings covered in detail only the years from 1660 to 1815. While not
neglecting this period, this book is particularly valuable for events not
within its self-assigned limits. Practically it is a history of naval
warfare from ancient times to the present day. Each chapter deals briefly,
but ably, with one epoch and closes with an appropriate bibliography for
those who care to go more fully into the question; a commendable feature.
The last chapter, 'Conclusions,' deserves especial attention. Naturally,
considerable space is devoted to the story and analysis of Jellicoe's
fight. Few will disagree with the verdict of the authors:

"'It is no reflection on the personal courage of the Commander-in-Chief
that he should be moved by the consideration of saving his ships. The
existence of the Grand Fleet was, of course, essential to the Allied
cause, and there was a heavy weight of responsibility hanging on its use.
But again it is a matter of naval doctrine. Did the British fleet exist
merely to maintain a numerical preponderance over its enemy or to crush
that enemy--whatever the cost? If the Battle of Jutland receives the stamp
of approval as the best that could have been done, then the British or the
American officer of the future will know that he is expected primarily to
"play safe." But he will never tread the path of Blake, Hawke, or Nelson,
the men who made the traditions of the Service and forged the anchors of
the British Empire.'

"One factor in the success of the antisubmarine campaign is not mentioned,
important as it proved to be. This was the policy adopted by the Allies of
not giving out the news that any U-boat was captured or otherwise
accounted for. Confronted with this appalling veil of mystery the morale
of the German submarine crews became seriously affected; volunteering for
this service gradually ceased; arbitrary detail grew necessary; greatly
lessened efficiency resulted.

"The authors are to be congratulated on producing a volume which should be
in the hands of all naval officers of the coming generation; on the
shelves of all who take interest in the development of history; and of
statesmen upon whom may eventually rest the