r
efforts might be concentrated on the larger questions.

"The appendices are of value and interesting because they show the
organisation at different periods and emphasise the fact that the Naval
Staff at the end of the war was the result of trial and error, natural
growth, and at least one radical change adopted during the war.

"Chapters II and III deal with the Submarine Campaign in 1917 and the
measures adopted to win success. The gradual naval control of all merchant
shipping with its attendant difficulties is clearly shown. The tremendous
labour involved in putting into operation new measures; the unremitting
search for and development of new antisubmarine devices is revealed, and
above all the length of time necessary to put into operation any new
device, and this when time is the most precious element, is pointed out.

"That a campaign against the enemy must be waged with every means at hand;
that new weapons must be continually sought; that no 'cure-all' by which
the enemy may be defeated without fighting can be expected; that during
war is the poorest time to provide the material which should be provided
during peace, the Admiral shows in a manner not to be gainsaid.

"Chapters IV and V deal with the testing, introduction, and gradual growth
of the convoy system. It is shown how the introduction of this system was
delayed by lack of vessels to perform escort duty and why when finally
adopted it was so successful because it was not only defensive but
offensive in that it meant a fight for a submarine to attack a vessel
under convoy.

"Chapter VI is devoted to the entry of the United States. The accurate
estimate of our naval strength by both the enemy and the allies, and our
inability upon the declaration of war to lend any great assistance are
shown--and this at the most critical period for the Allies--a period when
the German submarine campaign was at its height, when the tonnage lost
monthly by the Allies was far in excess of what can be replaced--when the
destruction of merchant shipping if continued at the then present rate
would in a few months mean the defeat of the Allies."

=vi=

I will give you what Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich said in the Weekly Review
(30 April 1921; The Weekly Review has since been combined with The
Independent) regarding _A History of Sea Power_, by William O. Stevens and
Allan Westcott:

"Two professors at the Naval Academy, the one a historian, the other a
close student