e, that the enemy was retiring in considerable
disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed
with determination.
Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the
mounted troops, directing them on the line El Tine-Beit Duras, with
orders to press the enemy relentlessly. They were to be supported by a
portion of the force, which was ordered to push forward to Julis and
Mejdel.
[Sidenote: Enemy pursued toward Hebron by the Yeomanry.]
The enemy opposite our right flank guard had commenced to retreat
towards Hebron on the morning of the 8th. He was pursued for a short
distance by the Yeomanry, and some prisoners and camels were captured,
but the Yeomanry were then recalled to rejoin the main body of the
mounted troops for the more important task of the pursuit of the enemy's
main body.
[Sidenote: The problem of water and forage.]
By the 9th, therefore, operations had reached the stage of a direct
pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied so far in front of
railhead. The problem, in fact, became one of supply rather than
man[oe]uvre. The question of water and forage was a very difficult one.
Even where water was found in sufficient quantities, it was usually in
wells and not on the surface, and consequently if the machinery for
working the wells was damaged, or a sufficient supply of troughs was not
available, the process of watering a large quantity of animals was slow
and difficult.
[Sidenote: Enemy organizes a counterattack.]
[Sidenote: Enemy's losses heavy.]
On the evening of November 9 there were indications that the enemy was
organizing a counterattack towards Arak el Menshiye by all available
units of the force which had retired towards Hebron, with the object of
taking pressure off the main force, which was retiring along the coastal
plain. It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be
short of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily and to be in a
generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and
that this threat could practically be disregarded. Other information
showed the seriousness of the enemy's losses and the disorganization of
his forces.
[Sidenote: Imperial Camel Corps ordered to Tel de Nejile.]
Orders were accordingly issued to press the pursuit and to reach the
Junction Station as early as possible, thus cutting off the Jerusalem
Army, while the Imperial Camel Corps was ordered to move to th
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