o be greater than anticipated, and the preparations for the
second phase of the attack were somewhat delayed in consequence.
On the early morning of November 1 the 53rd (Welsh) Division, with the
Imperial Camel Corps on its right, had moved out into the hills north of
Beersheba, with the object of securing the flank of the attack on
Sheria. Mounted troops were also sent north along the Hebron Road to
secure Dhaheriyeh if possible, as it was hoped that a good supply of
water would be found in this area, and that a motor road which the Turks
were reported to have constructed from Dhaheriyeh to Sheria could be
secured for our use.
The 53rd (Welsh) Division, after a long march, took up a position from
Towal Abu Jerwal (six miles north of Beersheba) to Muweileh (four miles
north-east of Abu Irgeig). Irish troops occupied Abu Irgeig the same
day.
[Sidenote: Advance on Kohleh and Khuweilfeh.]
On November 3 we advanced north on Ain Kohleh and Tel Khuweilfeh, near
which place the mounted troops had engaged considerable enemy forces on
the previous day. This advance was strongly opposed, but was pushed on
through difficult hill country to within a short distance of Ain Kohleh
and Khuweilfeh. At these places the enemy was found holding a strong
position with considerable and increasing forces. He was obviously
determined not only to bar any further progress in this direction, but,
if possible, to drive our flankguard back on Beersheba. During the 4th
and 5th he made several determined attacks on the mounted troops. These
attacks were repulsed.
[Sidenote: Hostile cavalry between Khuweilfeh and Hebron Road.]
By the evening of November 5 the 19th Turkish Division, the remains of
the 27th and certain units of the 16th Division had been identified in
the fighting round Tel el Khuweilfeh, and it was also fairly clear that
the greater part of the hostile cavalry, supported apparently by some
infantry ("depot" troops) from Hebron, were engaged between Khuweilfeh
and the Hebron Road.
[Sidenote: Enemy tries to draw forces north of Beersheba.]
The action of the enemy in thus employing the whole of his available
reserves in an immediate counter-stroke so far to the east was
apparently a bold effort to induce me to make essential alterations in
my offensive plan, thereby gaining time and disorganizing my
arrangements. The country north of Beersheba was exceedingly rough and
hilly, and very little water was to be found there. H
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