articularly so far as
respects the constitutional difficulty. I am aware of the force of
the observations you make on the power given by the constitution to
Congress, to admit new States into the Union, without restraining the
subject to the territory then constituting the United States. But when I
consider that the limits of the United States are precisely fixed by the
treaty of 1783, that the constitution expressly declares itself to be
made for the United States, I cannot help believing the intention was
not to permit Congress to admit into the Union new States, which should
be formed out of the territory for which, and under whose authority
alone, they were then acting. I do not believe it was meant that they
might receive England, Ireland, Holland, &tc. into it, which would
be the case on your construction. When an instrument admits two
constructions, the one safe, the other dangerous, the one precise, the
other indefinite, I prefer that which is safe and precise. I had
rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found
necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make our
powers boundless. Our peculiar security is in the possession of a
written constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.
I say the same as to the opinion of those who consider the grant of
the treaty-making power as boundless. If it is, then we have no
constitution. If it has bounds, they can be no others than the
definitions of the powers which that instrument gives. It specifies and
delineates the operations permitted to the federal government, and gives
all the powers necessary to carry these into execution. Whatever of
these enumerated objects is proper for a law, Congress may make the law;
whatever is proper to be executed by way of a treaty, the President and
Senate may enter into the treaty; whatever is to be done by a judicial
sentence, the judges may pass the sentence. Nothing is more likely than
that their enumeration of powers is defective. This is the ordinary case
of all human works. Let us go on then perfecting it, by adding, by way
of amendment to the constitution, those powers which time and trial show
are still wanting. But it has been taken too much for granted, that by
this rigorous construction the treaty power would be reduced to nothing.
I had occasion once to examine its effect on the French treaty, made by
the old Congress, and found that out of thirty odd articles which that