nt's opinion, that the interests
and dispositions of this country were for peace. Hamilton produced his
statement, in which he declared his intention to be, to say nothing
which could be laid hold of for any purpose; to leave the proclamation
to explain itself. He entered pretty fully into all the argumentation
of Pacificus; he justified the right of the President to declare his
opinion for a future neutrality, and that there existed no circumstances
to oblige the United States to enter into the war on account of the
guarantee; and that in agreeing to the proclamation, he meant it to be
understood as conveying both those declarations; viz. neutrality, and
that the _casus foederis_ on the guarantee did not exist. He admitted
the Congress might declare war, notwithstanding these declarations of
the President. In like manner, they might declare war in the face of a
treaty, and in direct infraction of it. Among other positions laid down
by him, this was with great positiveness; that the constitution having
given power to the President and Senate to make treaties, they might
make a treaty of neutrality which should take from Congress the right to
declare war in that particular case, and that under the form of a treaty
they might exercise any powers whatever, even those exclusively given by
the constitution to the House of Representatives. Randolph opposed this
position, and seemed to think that where they undertook to do acts by
treaty (as to settle a tariff of duties), which were exclusively given
to the legislature, that an act of the legislature would be necessary
to confirm them, as happens in England, when a treaty interferes with
duties established by law. I insisted that in giving to the President
and Senate a power to make treaties, the constitution meant only to
authorize them to carry into effect, by way of treaty, any powers they
might constitutionally exercise. I was sensible of the weak points in
this position, but there were still weaker in the other hypothesis; and
if it be impossible to discover a rational measure of authority to have
been given by this clause, I would rather suppose that the cases
which my hypothesis would leave unprovided, were not thought of by the
convention, or if thought of, could not be agreed on, or were thought
of and deemed unnecessary to be invested in the government. Of this
last description, were treaties of neutrality, treaties offensive and
defensive, &c. In every event, I would