cal sentiments, but he had never suspected it had gone so
far in producing a personal difference, and he wished he could be the
mediator to put an end to it. That he thought it important to preserve
the check of my opinions in the administration, in order to keep things
in their proper channel, and prevent them from going too far. That as
to the idea of transforming this government into a monarchy, he did
not believe there were ten men in the United States whose opinions were
worth attention, who entertained such a thought. I told him there were
many more than he imagined. I recalled to his memory a dispute at
his own table, a little before we left Philadelphia, between General
Schuyler on one side and Pinckney and myself on the other, wherein the
former maintained the position, that hereditary descent was as likely to
produce good magistrates as election. I told him, that though the
people were sound, there were a numerous sect who had monarchy in
contemplation; that the Secretary of the Treasury was one of these. That
I had heard him say that this constitution was a shilly-shally thing, of
mere milk and water, which could not last, and was only good as a step
to something better. That when we reflected, that he had endeavored in
the convention, to make an English constitution of it, and when failing
in that, we saw all his measures tending to bring it to the same thing,
it was natural for us to be jealous; and particularly, when we saw that
these measures had established corruption in the legislature, where
there was a squadron devoted to the nod of the Treasury, doing whatever
he had directed, and ready to do what he should direct. That if the
equilibrium of the three great bodies, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, could be preserved, if the legislature could be kept
independent, I should never fear the result of such a government;
but that I could not but be uneasy, when I saw that the executive had
swallowed up the legislative branch. He said, that as to that interested
spirit in the legislature, it was what could not be avoided in any
government, unless we were to exclude particular descriptions of men,
such as the holders of the funds, from all office. I told him, there was
great difference between the little accidental schemes of self-interest,
which would take place in every body of men, and influence their votes,
and a regular system for forming a corps of interested persons, who
should be steadily at the o