to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus,
even when he left the consul in a hesitating frame of mind, and, though
a private man himself, commanded, with the authority of a consul, that
all who meant well to the republic should follow him. I do not know
whether I have done anything in the republic that has the appearance of
courage; but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth
anything come nearer madness than anger? And indeed Ennius has well
defined it as the beginning of madness. The changing color, the
alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching
our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how
little do all these things indicate a sound mind! What can make a worse
appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon, during the quarrel? And
as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madness, and was the
occasion of his death. Courage, therefore, does not want the assistance
of anger; it is sufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itself.
We may as well say that drunkenness or madness is of service to
courage, because those who are mad or drunk often do a great many
things with unusual vehemence. Ajax was always brave; but still he was
most brave when he was in that state of frenzy:

The greatest feat that Ajax e'er achieved
Was, when his single arm the Greeks relieved.
Quitting the field; urged on by rising rage,
Forced the declining troops again t'engage.

Shall we say, then, that madness has its use?

XXIV. Examine the definitions of courage: you will find it does not
require the assistance of passion. Courage is, then, an affection of
mind that endures all things, being itself in proper subjection to the
highest of all laws; or it may be called a firm maintenance of judgment
in supporting or repelling everything that has a formidable appearance,
or a knowledge of what is formidable or otherwise, and maintaining
invariably a stable judgment of all such things, so as to bear them or
despise them; or, in fewer words, according to Chrysippus (for the
above definitions are Sphaerus's, a man of the first ability as a
layer-down of definitions, as the Stoics think. But they are all pretty
much alike: they give us only common notions, some one way, and some
another). But what is Chrysippus's definition? Fortitude, says he, is
the knowledge of all things that are bearable, or an affection of the
mind which bears and supports everything in obedience to t