he sun," for Alexander was
hindering him from sunning himself. And, indeed, this very man used to
maintain how much he surpassed the Persian king in his manner of life
and fortune; for that he himself was in want of nothing, while the
other never had enough; and that he had no inclination for those
pleasures of which the other could never get enough to satisfy himself;
and that the other could never obtain his.

XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of
desires, not very acutely perhaps, but yet usefully: saying that they
are "partly natural and necessary; partly natural, but not necessary;
partly neither. That those which are necessary may be supplied almost
for nothing; for that the things which nature requires are easily
obtained." As to the second kind of desires, his opinion is that any
one may easily either enjoy or go without them. And with regard to the
third, since they are utterly frivolous, being neither allied to
necessity nor nature, he thinks that they should be entirely rooted
out. On this topic a great many arguments are adduced by the
Epicureans; and those pleasures which they do not despise in a body,
they disparage one by one, and seem rather for lessening the number of
them; for as to wanton pleasures, on which subject they say a great
deal, these, say they, are easy, common, and within any one's reach;
and they think that if nature requires them, they are not to be
estimated by birth, condition, or rank, but by shape, age, and person:
and that it is by no means difficult to refrain from them, should
health, duty, or reputation require it; but that pleasures of this kind
may be desirable, where they are attended with no inconvenience, but
can never be of any use. And the assertions which Epicurus makes with
respect to the whole of pleasure are such as show his opinion to be
that pleasure is always desirable, and to be pursued merely because it
is pleasure; and for the same reason pain is to be avoided, because it
is pain. So that a wise man will always adopt such a system of
counterbalancing as to do himself the justice to avoid pleasure, should
pain ensue from it in too great a proportion; and will submit to pain,
provided the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that
all pleasurable things, though the corporeal senses are the judges of
them, are still to be referred to the mind, on which account the body
rejoices while it perceives a present pleasure; but that