et him but grieve, no matter what the cause.
But he spoke this of a debauched and dissolute youth. But we are
inquiring into the conduct of a constant and wise man. We may even
allow a centurion or standard-bearer to be angry, or any others, whom,
not to explain too far the mysteries of the rhetoricians, I shall not
mention here; for to touch the passions, where reason cannot be come
at, may have its use; but my inquiry, as I often repeat, is about a
wise man.
XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you
pity rather than assist, if it is in your power to do so? Is it because
you cannot be liberal without pity? We should not take sorrows on
ourselves upon another's account; but we ought to relieve others of
their grief if we can. But to detract from another's reputation, or to
rival him with that vicious emulation which resembles an enmity, of
what use can that conduct be? Now, envy implies being uneasy at
another's good because one does not enjoy it one's self; but detraction
is the being uneasy at another's good, merely because he enjoys it. How
can it be right that you should voluntarily grieve, rather than take
the trouble of acquiring what you want to have? for it is madness in
the highest degree to desire to be the only one that has any particular
happiness. But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity
of evils? Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than
libidinous or desirous? or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid
being angry? or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being
vexed? or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful?
Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the
timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence? of which I could speak
very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible.
And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine
and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything. Hence it
is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns
as inferior to virtue. Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that
such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is
exposed to winds? What is there that can discompose such gravity and
constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of this kind
befall one to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to
man? Now, as to their saying that re
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