smell, and taste.
All feelings of this kind are a sort of melting pleasure that dissolves
the mind. Boastfulness is a pleasure that consists in making an
appearance, and setting off yourself with insolence.--The subordinate
species of lust they define in this manner: Anger is a lust of
punishing any one who, as we imagine, has injured us without cause.
Heat is anger just forming and beginning to exist, which the Greeks
call [Greek: thymosis]. Hatred is a settled anger. Enmity is anger
waiting for an opportunity of revenge. Discord is a sharper anger
conceived deeply in the mind and heart. Want an insatiable lust. Regret
is when one eagerly wishes to see a person who is absent. Now here they
have a distinction; so that with them regret is a lust conceived on
hearing of certain things reported of some one, or of many, which the
Greeks call [Greek: kategoremata], or predicaments; as that they are in
possession of riches and honors: but want is a lust for those very
honors and riches. But these definers make intemperance the fountain of
all these perturbations; which is an absolute revolt from the mind and
right reason--a state so averse to all rules of reason that the
appetites of the mind can by no means be governed and restrained. As,
therefore, temperance appeases these desires, making them obey right
reason, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind, so
intemperance, which is in opposition to this, inflames, confounds, and
puts every state of the mind into a violent motion. Thus, grief and
fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their rise from
intemperance.
X. Just as distempers and sickness are bred in the body from the
corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and
bile, so the mind is deprived of its health, and disordered with
sickness, from a confusion of depraved opinions that are in opposition
to one another. From these perturbations arise, first, diseases, which
they call [Greek: nosemata]; and also those feelings which are in
opposition to these diseases, and which admit certain faulty distastes
or loathings; then come sicknesses, which are called [Greek:
arrhostemata] by the Stoics, and these two have their opposite
aversions. Here the Stoics, especially Chrysippus, give themselves
unnecessary trouble to show the analogy which the diseases of the mind
have to those of the body: but, overlooking all that they say as of
little consequence, I shall treat only of the
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