ticks, is not easily comprehended, it is alleged, as an unanswerable
reason, that the colonies send no representatives to the house of
commons.

It is, say the American advocates, the natural distinction of a freeman,
and the legal privilege of an Englishman, that he is able to call his
possessions his own, that he can sit secure in the enjoyment of
inheritance or acquisition, that his house is fortified by the law, and
that nothing can be taken from him, but by his own consent. This consent
is given for every man by his representative in parliament. The
Americans, unrepresented, cannot consent to English taxations, as a
corporation, and they will not consent, as individuals.

Of this argument, it has been observed by more than one, that its force
extends equally to all other laws, for a freeman is not to be exposed to
punishment, or be called to any onerous service, but by his own consent.
The congress has extracted a position from the fanciful Montesquieu
that, "in a free state, every man, being a free agent, ought to be
concerned in his own government." Whatever is true of taxation, is true
of every other law, that he who is bound by it, without his consent, is
not free, for he is not concerned in his own government.

He that denies the English parliament the right of taxation, denies it,
likewise, the right of making any other laws, civil or criminal, yet
this power over the colonies was never yet disputed by themselves. They
have always admitted statutes for the punishment of offences, and for
the redress or prevention of inconveniencies; and the reception of any
law draws after it, by a chain which cannot be broken, the unwelcome
necessity of submitting to taxation.

That a freeman is governed by himself, or by laws to which he has
consented, is a position of mighty sound; but every man that utters it,
with whatever confidence, and every man that hears it, with whatever
acquiescence, if consent be supposed to imply the power of refusal,
feels it to be false. We virtually and implicitly allow the institutions
of any government, of which we enjoy the benefit, and solicit the
protection. In wide extended dominions, though power has been diffused
with the most even hand, yet a very small part of the people are either
primarily or secondarily consulted in legislation. The business of the
publick must be done by delegation. The choice of delegates is made by a
select number, and those who are not electors stand idle