them in habiliments of terrour, and try to
make us think them formidable. The Bostonians can call into the field
ninety thousand men. While we conquer all before us, new enemies will
rise up behind, and our work will be always to begin. If we take
possession of the towns, the colonists will retire into the inland
regions, and the gain of victory will be only empty houses, and a wide
extent of waste and desolation. If we subdue them for the present, they
will universally revolt in the next war, and resign us, without pity, to
subjection and destruction.

To all this it may be answered, that between losing America, and
resigning it, there is no great difference; that it is not very
reasonable to jump into the sea, because the ship is leaky. All those
evils may befall us, but we need not hasten them.

The dean of Gloucester has proposed, and seems to propose it seriously,
that we should, at once, release our claims, declare them masters of
themselves, and whistle them down the wind. His opinion is, that our
gain from them will be the same, and our expense less. What they can
have most cheaply from Britain, they will still buy; what they can sell
to us at the highest price, they will still sell.

It is, however, a little hard, that, having so lately fought and
conquered for their safety, we should govern them no longer. By letting
them loose before the war, how many millions might have been saved. One
wild proposal is best answered by another. Let us restore to the French
what we have taken from them. We shall see our colonists at our feet,
when they have an enemy so near them. Let us give the Indians arms, and
teach them discipline, and encourage them, now and then, to plunder a
plantation. Security and leisure are the parents of sedition.

While these different opinions are agitated, it seems to be determined,
by the legislature, that force shall be tried. Men of the pen have
seldom any great skill in conquering kingdoms, but they have strong
inclination to give advice. I cannot forbear to wish, that this
commotion may end without bloodshed, and that the rebels may be subdued
by terrour rather than by violence; and, therefore, recommend such a
force as may take away, not only the power, but the hope of resistance,
and, by conquering without a battle, save many from the sword.

If their obstinacy continues, without actual hostilities, it may,
perhaps, be mollified, by turning out the soldiers to free quarters,
forbid