ers. It is of no use for
any other province; and, with regard even to them, must have been
considered as one of the grants in which the king has been deceived; and
annulled, as mischievous to the publick, by sacrificing to one little
settlement the general interest of the empire; as infringing the system
of dominion, and violating the compact of government. But Dr. Tucker has
shown, that even this charter promises no exemption from parliamentary
taxes.

In the controversy agitated about the beginning of this century, whether
the English laws could bind Ireland, Davenant, who defended against
Molyneux the claims of England, considered it as necessary to prove
nothing more, than that the present Irish must be deemed a colony.

The necessary connexion of representatives with taxes, seems to have
sunk deep into many of those minds, that admit sounds, without their
meaning.

Our nation is represented in parliament by an assembly as numerous as
can well consist with order and despatch, chosen by persons so
differently qualified in different places, that the mode of choice seems
to be, for the most part, formed by chance, and settled by custom. Of
individuals, far the greater part have no vote, and, of the voters, few
have any personal knowledge of him to whom they intrust their liberty
and fortune.

Yet this representation has the whole effect expected or desired, that
of spreading so wide the care of general interest, and the participation
of publick counsels, that the advantage or corruption of particular men
can seldom operate with much injury to the publick.

For this reason many populous and opulent towns neither enjoy nor desire
particular representatives: they are included in the general scheme of
publick administration, and cannot suffer but with the rest of the
empire.

It is urged, that the Americans have not the same security, and that a
British legislator may wanton with their property; yet, if it be true,
that their wealth is our wealth, and that their ruin will be our ruin,
the parliament has the same interest in attending to them, as to any
other part of the nation. The reason why we place any confidence in our
representatives is, that they must share in the good or evil which their
counsels shall produce. Their share is, indeed, commonly consequential
and remote; but it is not often possible that any immediate advantage
can be extended to such numbers as may prevail against it. We are,
therefore, as se