ames of other
things transferred to them. We speak of our own foot, of the foot of a
couch, of a sail, or of a poem; we apply the word 'dog' to a hound, a
fish, and a star. Because we have not enough words to assign a separate
name to each thing, we borrow a name whenever we want one. Bravery is
the virtue which rightly despises danger, or the science of repelling,
sustaining, or inviting dangers: yet we call a brave man a gladiator,
and we use the same word for a good-for-nothing slave, who is led by
rashness to defy death. Economy is the science of avoiding unnecessary
expenditure, or the art of using one's income with moderation: yet we
call a man of mean and narrow mind, most economical, although there is
an immeasurable distance between moderation and meanness. These things
are naturally distinct, yet the poverty of our language compels us to
call both these men economical, just as he who views slight accidents
with rational contempt, and he who without reason runs into danger are
alike called brave. Thus a benefit is both a beneficent action, and also
is that which is bestowed by that action, such as money, a house, an
office in the state: there is but one name for them both, though their
force and power are widely different.
XXXV. Wherefore, give me your attention, and you will soon perceive that
I say nothing to which you can object. That benefit which consists of
the action is repaid when we receive it graciously; that other, which
consists of something material, we have not then repaid, but we hope to
do so. The debt of goodwill has been discharged by a return of goodwill;
the material debt demands a material return. Thus, although we may
declare that he who has received a benefit with good-will has returned
the favour, yet we counsel him to return to the giver something of the
same kind as that which he has received. Some part of what we have said
departs from the conventional line of thought, and then rejoins it by
another path. We declare that a wise man cannot receive an injury; yet,
if a man hits him with his fist, that man will be found guilty of doing
him an injury. We declare that a fool can possess nothing; yet if a man
stole anything from a fool, we should find that man guilty of theft. We
declare that all men are mad, yet we do not dose all men with hellebore;
but we put into the hands of these very persons, whom we call madmen,
both the right of voting and of pronouncing judgment. Similarly, we say
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