civilization, the force of rival testimony in disproof of
them, which he illustrates by historic examples, such as the alleged
miracles of Vespasian, Apollonius, and the Jansenist Abbe Paris.(481) The
conclusion is, that miracles cannot be so shown to occur as to be used as
the basis of proof for a revelation; and that a revelation, if believed,
must rest on other evidence.

The argument accordingly is briefly, that testimony cannot establish a
fact which contradicts a law of nature; the narrower induction cannot
disprove the wider. The reasoning has been used in subsequent
controversy(482) with only a slight increase of force, or alteration of
statement. The great and undeniable discoveries of astronomy had convinced
men in the age of Hume of the existence of an order of nature; and modern
discovery has not increased the proof of this in kind, though it has
heightened it in degree, by showing that as knowledge spreads the range of
the operation of fixed law is seen to extend more widely; and apparent
exceptions are found to be due to our ignorance of the presence of a law,
not to its absence. The statement of the difficulty would accordingly now
be altered by the introduction of a slight modification. Instead of urging
that testimony cannot prove the historic reality of the fact which we call
a miracle, the assertion would be made that it can only attest the
existence of it as a wonder, and is unable to prove that it is anything
but an accidental result of an unknown cause. A miracle differs from a
wonder, in that it is an effect wrought by the direct interposition of the
Creator and Governor of nature, for the purpose of revealing a message or
attesting a revelation. That testimony can substantiate wonders, but not
distinguish the miracle from the wonder, is the modern form of the
difficulty.

The connexion of Hume's view with his metaphysical principles will be
evident. If nature be known only through the senses, cause is only the
material antecedent visible to the senses. Nature is not seen to be the
sphere of the operation of God's regular will; and the sole proof of
interference with nature must be a balancing of inductions. It will be
clear also that the true method of replying to Hume has been rightly
perceived by those who consider that the difficulty must be met by
philosophy, and not by history.

Suppose the historic evidence sufficient to attest the wonder, it does not
prove that the wonder is a miracle. T